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Abstract—Consider N servers with replicated databases con-
taining M records. Suppose a user wants to privately retrieve
one record by accessing the servers such that the identity of the
retrieved record is secret against any up to T servers. A scheme
designed for this purpose is called a T -private information
retrieval (T -PIR) scheme. Three indexes are concerned for PIR
schemes:
(1) rate, indicating the amount of retrieved information per
unit of downloaded data. The highest achievable rate is
characterized by the capacity;
(2) sub-packetization, reflecting the implementation complexity
for linear schemes;
(3) field size. We consider linear schemes over a finite field.
In this paper, a general T -PIR scheme simultaneously attaining
the optimality of almost all of the three indexes is presented.
Specifically, we design a linear capacity-achieving T -PIR scheme
with sub-packetization dnM−1 over a finite field Fq , q ≥ N . The
sub-packetization dnM−1, where d=gcd(N,T ) and n=N/d, has
been proved to be optimal in our previous work. The field size is
reduced by an exponential factor in our scheme comparing with
existing capacity-achieving T -PIR schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) involves
a database containing M records stored across N servers
and a user who wants to privately retrieve one record by
accessing the servers. The privacy requirement means any
colluding subset of at most T servers knows nothing about
the identity of the retrieved record. Since it is closely related
to cryptography [2] and coding theory [13], PIR has become a
central research topic in the computer science literature since
it was first introduced by Chor et al. [4] in 1995. A survey on
PIR can be found in [7].
A central issue in PIR is minimizing the communication
cost which is measured by the total number of bits transferred
from the user to the servers (i.e. the query size) and those
from servers to the user (i.e. the answer size). In the initial
setting of PIR where each record is one bit long, the least
communication cost achieved by now isMO(
1
log logM ) [5], [6].
Recently, an information-theoretic reformulation of the PIR
problem [3] allows all records to be arbitrarily large, which
is more relevant to real-life applications. In this sense, the
query size is always negligible compared to the answer size.
Thus communication cost can be measured by taking only
the answer size into account. Specifically, define the rate of
a PIR scheme as the ratio between the size of the retrieved
record and the answer size, and define the capacity as the
supremum of the rate over all PIR schemes. Obviously, the
capacity characterizes the highest rate that can be achieved
for a given PIR problem.
Sun and Jafar [8] first proved that the capacity of PIR for
replicated non-colluding servers (i.e., T = 1) is 1−1/N
1−(1/N)M
.
They further proved in [9] the capacity for the colluding
case (i.e., T -PIR, 1 ≤ T < N ) is 1−T/N
1−(T/N)M
and designed a
capacity-achieving PIR scheme over a finite filed Fq , where
q ≥max{N2TM−2, N2(N−T )M−2}. Meantime, the capacity
for PIR with symmetric privacy was determined in [10], and
that for PIR with MDS coded non-colluding servers was
studied in [1], [12]. In this work, we focus on PIR problems
from replicated servers and only non-symmetric privacy is
concerned. A detailed model for the PIR problem studied in
this work is presented in Section II.
A key step for determining the capacity is to design a
general capacity-achieving PIR scheme. All existing schemes
are implemented by dividing each record into segments (taken
as elements in the finite field Fq) and querying from each
server some combinations of the segments. We call the number
of segments contained in each record that are necessary for
the scheme implementation as sub-packetization which reflects
implementation complexity for linear schemes where only
linear operations over the segments are involved. The schemes
provided in [8], [9] both have sub-packetization NM. In
[11] the sub-packetization was firstly reduced to NM−1 for
replicated servers and T = 1. For general values of T , we
recently proved in [14] that the optimal sub-packetization for
linear capacity-achieving T -PIR schemes is dnM−1, where
d = gcd(N, T ), n = N/d.
Since all existing PIR schemes are linear over a finite
field, the field size is also an important metric related to the
computational complexity. A recent improvement on the field
size for capacity-achieving T -PIR schemes is obtained in [14]
which reduces the field size by a factor of NdM−2 comparing
with the scheme in [8], that is, the scheme in [14] operates
over a finite field Fq, q ≥ max{Nt
M−2, N(n− t)M−2}, where
t = T/d. However, the field size is still larger than NtM−2
which expands exponentially as M grows.
The main contribution of this work is a great reduction on
the field size for T -PIR schemes which simultaneously achieve
the capacity and the optimal sub-packetization. Specifically,
we design a linear capacity-achieving T -PIR scheme with sub-
packetization dnM−1 over a finite field Fq, q≥N . Comparing
with previous schemes, the field size is reduced by an ex-
ponential factor and become a constant for a fixed storage
system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, the PIR
model is formally defined in Section II. Then an example of
the T -PIR scheme is presented in Section III to explain our
design idea. The general descriptions of our scheme are given
in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. NOTATIONS AND THE PIR MODEL
For an integer n∈N, we denote by [n] the set {1, ..., n}. For
a vector Q = (q1, ..., qn) and a subset Γ = {i1, ..., im} ⊆ [n],
denote QΓ = (qi1 , ..., qim). Most vectors in this paper are row
vectors and they are denoted by the capital letters (eg. W,Q).
Denote the M records as W1, ...,WM and the N servers as
Serv(1), ..., Serv(N). In this paper, we focus on PIR for replicated
servers, that is, assume each server stores all the M records.
Then suppose a user wants to privately retrieve Wθ for some
θ∈ [M ]. Basically, a PIR scheme consists of two phases:
• Query phase. Given θ ∈ [M ] and some random resources
S, the user computes Que(θ, S) = (Q(1)θ , ..., Q
(N)
θ ), and
sends Q
(j)
θ to Serv
(j) for 1≤j≤N . Note that S and θ are
private information only known by the user, and Que(·, ·)
is the query function defined by the scheme.
• Response phase. For 1≤j≤N , the jth server Serv(j) at
receiving Q
(j)
θ , computes Ans
(j)(Q
(j)
θ ,W[M]) = A
(j)
θ and
sends it back to the user, where Ans(j)(·, ·) is Serv(j)’s
answer function defined by the scheme.
To design a PIR scheme is to design the functions Que and
Ans(j), 1≤ j≤N , such that the following two conditions are
satisfied:
(1) Correctness: The user can recover Wθ after collecting all
answers from the N servers, i.e., H(Wθ|A
[N]
θ , Q
[N]
θ , S, θ)=
0, where H(·|·) is the conditional entropy.
(2) Privacy: For any Γ⊆ [N ] with |Γ|≤T , the serves in Γ
have no information on θ even if they collude with each
other, i.e., I(θ;QΓθ , A
Γ
θ ,W[M]) = 0, where I(· ; ·) denotes
the mutual information.
Particularly, if Wi ∈ F
L
q and the answer A
(j)
θ turns out to be
linear combinations of Wi’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ M and 1 ≤ j ≤ N ,
we call the scheme a linear T -PIR scheme, and call L the
sub-packetization of the scheme.
Define the rate R of a PIR scheme by
R =
H(Wθ)∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ )
,
that is, R characterizes the amount of retrieved information
per unit of downloaded data. Furthermore, the supremum of
the rate over all PIR schemes that work for a given PIR
problem is called the capacity. It was determined in [9] that
the capacity of T -PIR schemes is 1−T/N
1−(T/N)M
.
The next theorem determines the optimal sub-packetization
for linear capacity-achieving T -PIR schemes.
Theorem 1. [14] Suppose M ≥2, N >T ≥ 1. For all linear
capacity-achieving T -PIR schemes with M records and N
replicated servers, its sub-packetization must be no less than
dnM−1, where d = gcd(N, T ), n = N/d. Moreover, the lower
bound can be obtained generally.
III. AN EXAMPLE FOR M = 3, N = 3, T = 2
Suppose M = 3, N = 3, T = 2. Since our T -PIR
scheme needs sub-packetization L= dnM−1 = 9, each record
is regarded as a 9-dimensional row vector over Fq, i.e.,
W1,W2,W3∈F
9
q, where q ≥ 3. WLOG, assume the user wants
to retrieve W1, i.e., θ = 1. The scheme is described in two
parts:
Part I: Mixing-Rearranging.
Let S1, S2, S3 be three random matrices chosen by the user
independently and uniformly from all 9×9 invertible matrices
over Fq. And, S1, S2, S3 are only known by the user. Define
(aij)3×3 = Mat3×3(W1S1)
(bij)3×3 = Mat3×3(W2S2[:, (1 :6)](I3 ⊗G))
(cij)3×3 = Mat3×3(W3S3[:, (1 :6)](I3 ⊗G)) (1)
whereMats×t(·) is to write out a s×tmatrix row by row from a
st-dimensional vector. For example, Mat2×3
(
(1, 2, 0, 0, 1, 2)
)
=(
1 2 0
0 1 2
)
. And, Si[:, (1 :6)] denotes the matrix composed of
the first 6 columns of Si, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, I3
is the 3× 3 identity matrix, and G is a 2× 3 generator matrix
of some fixed [3, 2] MDS code over Fq .
Specifically, write the three matrices generated in (1) as(
a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
)
,
(
b11 b12 b13
b21 b22 b23
a31 b32 b33
)
,
(
c11 c12 c13
c21 c22 c23
c31 c32 c33
)
, (2)
then one can see each aij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, is a random linear
combination of the 9 coordinates of W1, and (aij)3×3 is
actually an invertible transformation of W1, while (bij)3×3 is
composed of three independent codewords (as rows) in the
[3, 2] MDS code, encoded from 6 symbols each of which
is a random linear combination of coordinates of W2. The
construction of (cij)3×3 is similar to that of (bij)3×3.
Part II: Combining.
We complete description of the scheme by listing in Table
1 the answers from all servers.
→(a1)
→(a2)
→(a1)
→(a2)
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a11, b11, c11 a13, b13, c13
a22, b22, c22 a23, b23, c23
a12+b12, a32+c12
a21+b21, a31+c21
b31+c31 b32+c32
a33+b33+c33
Table 1: Answer table of the T -PIR scheme for (M=3, N=3, T =2) and θ=1.
It can be seen that the answers are all sums of the sym-
bols aij , bij , cij . Because aij’s are generated from W1, the
record desired by the user, we call aij the desired symbol.
Accordingly, we call bij , cij the interference symbol. Likewise,
all sums that do not involve aij’s, such as bij + ci′j′ , are
called interference sums. The sums that involve both aij ’s
and interference symbols, such as aij + bi′j′ , aij + ci′j′ , are
called mixed sums. Basically, the answer table is built up by
iteratively applying the following two steps:
(a1) Enforce record symmetry within each server.
(a2) Form mixed sums by combining new desired symbols with
recoverable interferences.
As shown in Table 1, the record symmetry within each
server has been enforced in the first two lines. That is, one
symbol from each record is queried from Serv(1), and also
from Serv(2), while two symbols from each record are queried
from Serv(3). Now, since the symbols b11 and b13 have been
provided by Serv(1) and Serv(3) respectively, the symbol b12
is recoverable because (b11, b12, b13) is a codeword in the
[3, 2] MDS code. Likewise, the symbols b21, c12, c21 are also
recoverable from the first two lines. Therefore, in the next two
lines these recoverable symbols are combined with aij ’s that
have not been queried so far. Finally, the last two lines of
Table 1 are formed by applying (a1) and (a2) respectively.
The correctness condition holds because the user can finally
obtain all aij ’s for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3 and then recover W1 by
multiplying S−11 . To explain the privacy condition, we first
point out a key observation of Table 1: for 1 ≤ j ≤ N ,
each entry in the jth column of the matrices in (2) appears
in Serv(j)’s answers exactly once. Therefore, the answers of
any two servers are formed by symbols from two columns of
the matrices which are completely independent because of the
[3, 2]MDS encoding. Then plus the record symmetry enforced
within each server, the privacy condition follows.
Finally, the total number of downloaded symbols from all
servers is 7+6+6=19 and each record consists of 9 symbols.
Hence the rate is 919 , which matches the capacity for this case.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERAL T -PIR SCHEME
Now we describe how our T -PIR scheme works generally
for M≥2 and 1≤T < N . Suppose W1, ...,WM ∈ FLq , and the
user wants to privately retrieve Wθ for some θ ∈ [M ]. Fix an
[N, T ] MDS code over Fq with a T ×N generator matrix G.
It requires q ≥ N to ensure existence of such an MDS code.
As in Section III, the general T -PIR scheme is described in
two parts:
Part I: Mixing-Rearranging.
Let S1, ..., SM be M matrices chosen by the user indepen-
dently and uniformly from all L× L invertible matrices over
Fq. As before, these Si’s are only known by the user. We first
assume N |L and L = NL˜. Later we will show L=NnM−2 is
enough for our scheme and this L matches the optimal sub-
packetization.
Define (Uθ)L˜×N = (u
(j)
θ,i)L˜×N = MatL˜×N(WθSθ), where for
the matrix entry u
(j)
θ,i , i is the row index and j is the column
index. Then as in (1), define for k∈ [M ]−{θ},
(Uk)L˜×N =(u
(j)
k,i)L˜×N =MatL˜×N
(
WkSk[:, (1 :T L˜)](IL˜ ⊗G)
)
.
Obviously, (Uθ)L˜×N is an invertible transformation of Wθ ,
while (Uk)L˜×N for k ∈ [M ]−{θ} is composed of independent
rows each of which is a codeword in the [N, T ] MDS code.
It is important to point out here the MDS encoding is used
for achieving T -privacy and capacity of the PIR scheme. It
has nothing to do with the database storage. In this work we
consider replicated databases, not the MDS coded databases
as in [1], [12].
Part II: Combining
In this part we build the answer table for general T -PIR
schemes. Fix k′ ∈ [M ]−{θ}, we first investigate how the
entries of the matrix (Uk′)L˜×N are put into the answer table.
For any Λ ⊆ [M ] and 1 ≤ j ≤ N , we call
∑
k∈Λ u
(j)
k,ik
an
Λ-type sum, where ik ∈ [L˜] is a row index. It is clear that
each entry of (Uk′)L˜×N appears in an Λ-type sum listed in
the answer table for some Λ ⊆ [M ] with k′ ∈ Λ. Particularly,
define for all k ∈ [M ]− {θ},
InTypek,θ = {Λ ⊂ [M ] | k ∈ Λ, θ 6∈ Λ} ,
and for any Λ ∈ InTypek,θ denote Λ = Λ ∪ {θ}.
First we associate each row of (Uk′)L˜×N with a type Λ ∈
InTypek′,θ. Note that multiple rows may be associated with
the same type. Moreover, because we always enforce record
symmetry within each server, for any Λ ∈ InTypek′,θ with
fixed cardinality |Λ| = i, the number of rows associated with
type Λ remains the same and we denote this number as di.
Moreover, the value of di is independent of the record index
k′. We will show how to determine di for 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1 in
Section IV-B. For convenience, we arrange these types in an
increasing order of cardinality as they run through all sets in
InTypek′,θ. As in the example, we have
type

b11 b12 b13
b21 b22 b23
b31 b32 b33


{2}
{2}
{2, 3}
,
type

c11 c12 c13
c21 c22 c23
c31 c32 c33


{3}
{3}
{2, 3}
(3)
which implies d1=2 and d2=1.
The entries of (Uk′)L˜×N are put into the answer table
according to the following rules (b1)-(b4):
(b1) For 1 ≤ j ≤ N , entries in the jth column only appear in
Serv(j)’s answers.
(b2) For each row associated with a type Λ ∈ InTypek′,θ, T
out of the N entries appear in Λ-type sums (i.e., inter-
ference symbols or interference sums) and the remaining
N −T entries appear in Λ-type sums (i.e., mixed sums).
For each Λ∈InTypek′,θ, denote by (Uk′)Λ×N the matrix
(Uk′)L˜×N restricted to the rows associated with the type Λ.
Suppose |Λ| = i, then (Uk′)Λ×N has di rows.
(b3) For each of the first T columns of (Uk′)Λ×N , αi entries
appear in Λ-type sums and the remaining αi+1=di−αi
entries appear in Λ-type sums.
(b4) For each of the last N − T columns of (Uk′)Λ×N , βi
entries appear in Λ-type sums and the remaining βi+1=
di−βi entries appear in Λ-type sums.
One can check the scheme in Section III follows the above
rules by combining (3) with Table 1. Actually, in (3) we have
indexed in boldface the symbols which appear in mixed sums
in Table 1. For example, in the first column of (bij)3×3, b11
appears in a {2}-type sum, which implies α1 = 1, α2 = 1,
and b31 appears in a {2, 3}-type sum, which implies α3 = 0
and also α2 = 1. While in the third column of (bij)3×3, both
b13 and b23 appear in {2}-type sums, which implies β1 =
2, β2 = 0, and b33 appears in an {1, 2, 3}-type sum, which
implies β3 = 1 and also β2 = 0.
Actually, the rules (b1)-(b4) are due to our intention to
guarantee correctness and privacy for the general scheme.
A. Correctness and privacy
Suppose Λ= {k1, ..., ks} ⊆ [M ]−{θ}. For 1 ≤ j ≤ s, the
matrix (Ukj )L˜×N has ds rows associated with the type Λ, and
all entries of the sub-matrix (Ukj )Λ×N appear in either Λ-type
sums or in Λ-type sums. Moreover, we can assume locations
of the entries that appear in Λ-type sums are the same across
all the sub-matrices (Ukj )Λ×N , 1 ≤ j ≤ s. For example, in (3)
we can see for Λ = {2, 3} the corresponding sub-matrices are(
b31 b32 b33
)
,
(
c31 c32 c33
)
.
Both have the first two entries as the ones to appear in {2, 3}-
type sums.
In general, for 1 ≤ t ≤ ds let Γt ⊂ [N ] be the set of column
indexes that indicate locations of the entries in the t-th row of
(Ukj )Λ×N to appear in Λ-type sums. Suppose the beginning
row index of the sub-matrix (Ukj )Λ×N is ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ s. Thus
all the Λ-type sums in the answer table are∑
1≤j≤s
u
(j′)
kj ,ij+t−1
, j′ ∈ Γt, 1 ≤ t ≤ s . (4)
Accordingly, all the Λ-type sums in the answer table are
u
(j′′)
θ,∗ +
∑
1≤j≤s
u
(j′′)
kj ,ij+t−1
, j′′ ∈ [N ]− Γt, 1 ≤ t ≤ s . (5)
Here we neglect the row index for the entry u
(j′′)
θ,∗ because each
time we simply use a new desired symbol to form the mixed
sums. Fix t ∈ [s], from the MDS encoding we know
(
∑
1≤j≤s
u
(1)
kj ,ij+t−1
,
∑
1≤j≤s
u
(2)
kj ,ij+t−1
, ...,
∑
1≤j≤s
u
(N)
kj ,ij+t−1
)
is a codeword in the [N, T ] MDS code. Therefore, the in-
terference parts in (5) are recoverable from the Λ-type sums
in (4). As a result, all the desirable symbols involved in (5),
i.e., u
(j′′)
θ,∗ ’s, can be obtained. As Λ runs through all types in
[M ]−{θ}, all desired symbols involved in the mixed sums
can be obtained similarly, which give us a belief that the
correctness condition can be satisfied. However, we still need
to determine the exact number of desired symbols, which will
be done in the next section.
About the privacy condition, rule (b1) first confines Serv(j)’s
answers to the entries in the j-th columns of (Uk)L˜×N , k ∈
[M ], then rules (b3)-(b4) require each entry is involved exactly
once in a symmetric form with respect to the records, i.e.,
for any Λ ⊆ [M ] with |Λ| = i, the number of Λ-type sums
provided by Serv(j) is αi for 1≤ j ≤ T and βi for T < j ≤
N . Therefore, the answers of any T servers correspond to
T columns of (Uk)L˜×N , k ∈ [M ], combined in a symmetric
manner. From the mixing-rearranging part we know any T
columns of the matrices are completely independent, therefore
distribution of the answers of any T servers is independent of
the retrieved index θ.
B. Determining αi and βi
We derive necessary conditions on αi and βi for feasibility
of the rules (b1)-(b4) in the following:

Tαi + (N − T )βi = diT
αi + αi+1 = di = βi + βi+1
αi, βi ∈ N, 1 ≤ i ≤M
(6)
By a similar computation as that given in [14], we obtain the
solutions to (6), i.e., for N ≥ 2T ,{
αi =
(n−t)i−2−(−t)i−2
n
(n− t)tM−i
βi =
(n−t)i−1−(−t)i−1
n
tM−i
, (7)
and for T < N < 2T ,{
αi =
tM−i−(t−n)M−i
n
(n− t)i−1
βi =
tM−i−1−(t−n)M−i−1
n
t(n− t)i−1
, (8)
where n = N/d, t = T/d and d = gcd(N, T ). It is important
to note that the values of αi and βi are independent of the
index θ, which means the partial symmetric structure of the
answer table is fixed for any given N, T and M , no matter
which record is to be retrieved. In other words, the partial
symmetric structure can be publicly known, which will not
affect the T -privacy.
Based on the values of αi and βi, we next compute sub-
packetization of the scheme. For any k ∈ [M ]−{θ}, di rows
of (Uk)L˜×N are associated with a type Λ ∈ InTypek,θ with
|Λ| = i, so L˜ ≥
∑M−1
i=1
(
M−2
i−1
)
di. From (6) we know di =
αi+Tβi/(N −T ). From (7) and (8) one can compute that for
1 ≤ i ≤M ,
Tαi + (N − T )βi = d(n− t)
i−1tM−i . (9)
Therefore, L˜ ≥
∑M−1
i=1
(
M−2
i−1
)
(n−t)i−1tM−i−1 = nM−2. As for the
matrix (Uθ)L˜×N , its entries appear in Λ-type sums for all Λ ⊆
[M ] with θ ∈ Λ. Particularly, for 1 ≤ j ≤ T , it needs L˜ ≥∑M
i=1
(
M−1
i−1
)
αi which implies L˜ ≥ n
M−2 from both (7) and
(8), while for T <j≤N , it needs L˜ ≥
∑M
i=1
(
M−1
i−1
)
βi which
still implies L˜ ≥ nM−2 from both (7) and (8). Hence, it is
enough to set L˜ = nM−2 in our scheme. Thus the scheme
has sub-packetization L = NL˜ = dnM−1 which matches the
optimal sub-packetization.
Then we compute rate of the scheme. It is easy to see the
number of downloaded symbols is D =
∑M
i=1
(
M
i
)(
Tαi+(N−
T )βi
)
which equals d(nM − tM )/(n− t) by (9). Hence the
rate of our scheme is LD = dn
M−1× n−td(nM−tM ) =
1−T/N
1−(T/N)M ,
attaining the capacity for T -PIR schemes.
C. Locator matrix
In order to realize (b2)-(b4), we define a locator matrixMi
associated with each type Λ ⊆ [M ] − {θ} with |Λ| = i such
that Mi is a di ×N binary matrix whose (i, j)-entry equals
1 if and only if the (i, j)-entries of the sub-matrices (Uk)Λ×N
for all k ∈ [M ]−{θ} appear in Λ-type sums. For example, for
Table 1 we have M1 =
(
1 0 1
0 1 1
)
and M2 =
(
1 1 0
)
.
It follows immediately the 0’s in Mi locate the interference
parts of the Λ-types sums. Specifically,
(1) by (b2) each row of Mi has T 1’s, or, equivalently, has
weight T .
(2) by (b3) and (b4) each column of Mi has weight αi for
the first T columns and weight βi for the last N − T
columns.
Therefore, the general scheme can be implemented easily so
long as we have built the binary matrices with the above
two properties. We next give an explicit construction of these
locator matrices.
Let E(u, v)m×n denote an m×n binary matrix that has
weight u for each row and weight v for each column. Evi-
dently, a necessary condition for existence of E(u, v)m×n is{
mu = nv
0 ≤ u ≤ n, 0 ≤ v ≤ m .
We can generally define E(u, v)m×n as below:
E(u, v)m×n =


eu
euPu
.
.
.
euP
m−1
u

 where eu = (
u︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1
n−u︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0)
and Pu=P
u, P =
(
0 In−1
1 0
)
. It is easy to see that euPu is a
cyclic right shift of eu by u coordinates.
Then combining with the solutions given in (7) and (8) one
can verify the following matrices define the locator matrices
needed for properties (1)-(2): for N ≥ 2T ,
Mi =
(
0 E(T, βi) (N−T)βi
T
×(N−T)
E(T, αi)αi×T 0
)
,
and for T < N < 2T ,
Mi =
(
E(2T −N, 2T−N
T
βi)βi×T E(N−T, βi)βi×(N−T)
E(T, αi−
2T−N
T
βi)(αi−
2T−N
T
βi)×T
0
)
.
D. Comparison with previous schemes
In this section we make comparisons with previous capacity-
achieving T -PIR schemes to give some insights into why
our scheme can reduce both the sub-packetization and the
field size. Since our scheme deals with PIR from T -colluding
servers with replicated databases, we restrict to the compar-
isons with previous schemes under the same model, such as
the schemes in [9], [14].
First, reduction on the sub-packetization from the scheme
in [9] is due to abandon of the symmetry across all servers.
Instead, we divide all servers into two groups, the first T
servers in one group and the remaining N−T servers in the
other, and then enforce the symmetry across the servers within
each group. That is, for any Λ ⊆ [M ] with |Λ| = i, the number
of Λ-type sums provided by Serv(j) is αi for 1≤j≤T and βi
for T <j≤N . The same technique was used in [14] and the
optimal sub-packetization is also achieved there. In one word,
the asymmetry between servers means only a fraction of the
answer table in [9] is retained, however, that is enough for a
capacity-achieving PIR scheme. On the other hand, the two-
group partition and the partial symmetry within each group
help to keep a neat implementation of the scheme.
Comparing with the scheme in [14], we further reduce the
field size to q ≥ N , because in this work we replace the
long MDS codes having information rate TN used in [14] with
products of [N, T ] MDS codes. Therefore, an MDS code with
much shorter length is sufficient here and the field size is
reduced accordingly. Specifically, for any Λ ⊆ [M ] − {θ}
with |Λ| = i, the correctness condition in both work relies
on the interference parts in all Λ-type sums being recoverable
as MDS parities from all Λ-type sums. However, in [14] the
interferences are encoded as a whole by using an MDS code
with rate TN and length (Tαi+(N−T )βi)
N
T = diN , while in
this work the interferences are encoded part by part through di
MDS codewords of length N . However, in order to maintain
the privacy condition and the partial symmetric structure, we
need to arrange these interferences in an properly designed
order as elaborated by the locator matrices in Section IV-C.
V. CONCLUSION
The T -PIR scheme presented in this work deals with PIR
problems from T -colluding servers with replicated databases.
It simultaneously attains the highest rate and the smallest sub-
packetization. Moreover, it only requires field size q ≥ N
which is a great reduction comparing with existing capacity-
achieving T -PIR schemes.
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